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Privatisation has become a key instrument in the stabilisation and Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed on Africa by the Bretton Woods  
institutions. It is an essential part of an overall strategy to open up African economies 
to market forces and promote private-sector development. Since public enterprises are 
considered to have performed dismally, African governments are under considerable 
pressure from international donors to sell them to domestic and foreign private 
capital. Given their troubled economic condition and acute dependence on foreign 
financial flows, African governments have officially accepted privatisation so as not 
to forfeit the international support crucial for their political survival. 
 Several authors, however, have observed that the actual number of 
privatisations has remained modest in Africa.1 They point to various technical and 
financial constraints as well as socio-political factors to explain this curious finding. 
Interestingly, some factors reflect the same political concerns that led to the creation 
of so many public enterprises in the years after independence: an inability to attract 
foreign investment to politically and economically unstable African nations, the 
absence of a well-developed domestic entrepreneurial class, and the pursuit of patron-
client relationships by African ‘patrimonial’ states.2 Some authors also highlight the 
resistance to privatisation by civil society, in particular by professional bodies, student 
organisations and trade unions, since privatisation often involves the sale of public 
property to well-placed nationals or to foreign enterprises, and generally results in 
massive lay-offs of workers.3 
 While there is now an abundance in literature on the role of chieftaincy in 
African post-colonial states,4 I have not yet come across any publication that 
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examines the role of chieftaincy in current privatisation projects. Leading specialists, 
including Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, appear to be more interested in the role of 
chieftaincy in political liberalisation than in economic liberalisation. 
 In the present paper I focus on the virulent opposition of Bakweri chiefs in 
Anglophone Cameroon to the government announcement on 15 July 1994 of the 
privatisation of the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), one of the oldest and 
largest agro-industrial parastatals in the country. These chiefs claimed Bakweri 
ownership of CDC lands. They felt betrayed at not having previously been consulted 
about the CDC privatisation, and warned the government that the corporation could 
not be sold to non-natives without Bakweri consent and compensation.  
 This chapter intends to demonstrate that the current resistance of the Bakweri 
chiefs to CDC privatisation is part of their long-standing struggle for the return of the 
vast Bakweri lands that were expropriated during German colonial rule for the 
purpose of plantation agriculture and later, in 1946, leased by the British Trust 
Authority to the newly created CDC. In this endeavour, they have always been 
assisted by the Bakweri ‘modern’ elite who, like their chiefs, felt aggrieved by the 
dramatic loss of their ancestral lands. Following the announcement of the privatisation 
of the CDC, the Bakweri chiefs have received support from other sectors of the 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elite in Anglophone Cameroon that are inclined to perceive 
the privatisation of the CDC as a renewed onslaught by the Francophone-dominated 
post-colonial state on Anglophone identity and colonial heritage. This alliance of the 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elites forms a mighty force to ensure that justice will 
prevail on the issue of the Bakweri lands. It has forced the government to repeatedly 
postpone the actual privatisation of the CDC and to finally enter into negotiations 
with the landowners. 
 In this article I first describe the fierce and protracted struggle by Bakweri 
chiefs for a return of the expropriated ancestral lands. This will provide the necessary 





Bakweri chiefs and the retrieval of CDC lands 
The Bakweri are a small ethnic group that live on the slopes of Mount Cameroon in 
the present Fako Division of the South West Province of Anglophone Cameroon.5 
Compared to the highly centralised states in the North West Province of Anglophone 
Cameroon ruled by powerful, even sacred, chiefs,6 the social organisation of the 
Bakweri, like that of most other ethnic groups in the South West Province, was 
segmentary. Chieftaincy tended to be a weak institution in the various autonomous 
Bakweri villages, and often a colonial creation. It was only during British indirect rule 
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that chieftaincy became rooted in the local communities and that two paramount 
chiefs were installed to act as the district heads of Buea and Victoria.7 
 When Cameroon became a German protectorate in 1884, the Germans 
characterised the Bakweri as an aggressive and savage people who might create 
problems for the opening up of the hinterland. In 1891, the Bakweri of Buea, under 
the leadership of the legendary Chief Kuva Likenye, the only Bakweri chief who had 
established a measure of military control over some of the surrounding villages,8 
defeated a German expedition. It was not until 1895 that their area was truly 
‘pacified’. The fertile, volcanic soils around Mount Cameroon proved suitable for 
large-scale plantation agriculture. More than 100,000 hectares of Bakweri land were 
expropriated by the German colonial state and the original occupants were expelled 
and sent to restrictive native reserves.9 German companies rushed to the area in a 
frenzied bid to get the best tracts of land10. In protest, the Bakweri showed little 
enthusiasm for work on the plantations, certainly not for the menial jobs there. They 
were no longer branded by the Germans as aggressive and savage but rather as 
apathetic or even downright lazy – a stereotype that has persevered until the present 
day.11 To solve the serious labour problem in the area, German planters were 
compelled to recruit labour from other areas in Cameroon. While initially most 
migrant workers returned to their region of origin after short spells of work on the 
estates, an increasing number gradually decided to settle in the area near the 
plantations after retiring, thus aggravating the land problem.12 This often resulted in 
extensive squatting by Bakweri and migrants alike on plantation lands which were 
only partly cultivated. Due to extreme overcrowding in the reserves, intruders 
frequently tried to ignore or resist eviction notices. The planters were sometimes 
obliged to surrender some of their land, while government purchased certain areas for 
the benefit of native communities.13 
 Following British occupation of the area during the World War I, the property 
of the German planters was confiscated and turned over to the Custodian of Enemy 
Property. When, shortly afterwards, the British took over the administration of the 
area,14 the plantations were merged and a government department was formed to 
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manage them. By 1922, however, the British Mandate Authority had already decided 
to dispose of them as the administrative costs of maintenance were said to be 
excessive. It seriously considered returning the plantation lands to the original owners 
but eventually abandoned the idea and instead concluded that it would be in the best 
interests of the territory and its inhabitants to return the plantations to the foreign 
private enterprises. According to Eyongetah and Brain,15 one of the principal reasons 
for the British Mandate Authority handing over the plantations to foreign planters 
was: 
  
‘…that it would have been impracticable to split the plantations into small plots for 
Cameroonian owners – since without capital backing, the buildings and machinery would 
fall into ruins. Moreover, it feared that the natives’ lack of experience would mean that 
disease would be spreading among the crops and the cocoa plots would be destroyed.’ 
  
Consequently, in 1922, the estates were put up for auction with a restriction on 
bidding by ex-enemy nationals. But little interest was shown in the plantations and 
very few were sold because of divergent reasons: the considerable capital resources 
needed to put the plantations that had been neglected since British occupation back 
into operation; the problem of recruiting and controlling labour; the low commodity 
prices then prevailing on the world market; and uncertainty at the time about the 
future of the mandated territories.16 Another auction was held in London in November 
1924, this time without restrictions on German bids and almost all the estates were 
bought by their former German owners. 
 At the start of the World War II, the German estates were expropriated again 
by the Custodian of Enemy Property. After the war, a decision had to be reached, 
once again, on how to dispose of the properties. Meanwhile, the young educated 
Bakweri elite had  founded several nationalist and ethnic associations such as the 
Cameroon Youth League (CYL) led by P.M. Kale and Dr. E.M.L. Endeley and the 
Bakweri Improvement Union under the leadership of J.A. Kale and D.M.L. Endeley.17 
This made a considerable contribution towards a growing awareness of colonial 
injustices regarding the Anglophone population in general and the Bakweri in 
particular, notably the large-scale expropriation of Bakweri lands by the Germans and 
the subsequent lack of land among the Bakweri people. As soon as they got wind of 
the ongoing British deliberations about the future of the ex-German plantations, they 
approached their chiefs for common action in defence of Bakweri interests. This 
eventually led to the formation of the Bakweri Land Committee (BCL).18 The BLC’s 
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original membership consisted of 48 men, including 25 chiefs. Members of the Buea 
chiefly family played a prominent role in the organisation. Paramount Chief G.M. 
Endeley was its president, his cousin, D.M.L. Endeley, was its secretary, and the 
latter’s brother, E.M.L. Endeley, was one of the driving forces behind it.19 On 8 June 
1946, Chief Endeley informed the Resident in Buea of the formation of the BCL. Its 
major objective, he stated, was ‘to take charge of all the land in Victoria Division 
which virtually belongs to the natives’. It was his fervent wish that the committee 
would continue to exist ‘as long as the Bakweri people live’20. 
 Upon its formation, the BLC sent several petitions to the British 
administration and, since Britain had assumed responsibility for the territory, the so-
called Southern Cameroons, under United Nations Trusteeship after the war, to the 
United Nations. On 24 August 1946 in a petition addressed to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, the BLC demanded that: 
  
• the ex-enemy plantations be handed back to the people of the Southern 
Cameroons; 
• part of the plantations originally belonging to the Bakweri people be handed 
over to the Bakweri administration; and 
• the profits made on the plantations by the Custodian during the last five years 
be paid to the Native Administration concerned as compensation for the loss 
of land expropriated from the Bakweri by the German government.21 
  
After considerable deliberations, however, the British Trusteeship Authority declined 
once again to surrender the former German plantation lands to their original owners. 
The British administration had little faith in the Bakweri peasantry’s ability to raise 
agricultural output. They therefore advocated a continuation of plantation production 
in the Trust Territory, all the more so because substantial investments had already 
been made in, and considerable profits been derived from, this form of production by 
the ex-German planters. Nevertheless, it was more reluctant this time to hand over the 
plantations to foreign, private enterprise, being well aware that such a transfer would 
badly hurt the rising expectations of the Bakweri and would certainly lead to 
vehement opposition by the BLC. Instead, it announced in November 1946 that the 
former German plantation lands would be leased to a newly established statutory 
corporation, the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). It hoped that the 
foundation of a public corporation, which would run the ex-German plantations for 
the benefit of the people of the territory, would reduce the expected Bakweri 
opposition. 
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 The proposed public corporation, the CDC, eventually came about with the 
passage of two ordinances during a special session of the Nigerian Legislative 
Council from 9-12 December 1946. The first ordinance, the Ex-Enemy Lands 
(Cameroons) Ordinance no. 38 (1946), provided for the acquisition of the ex-German 
plantation lands which had been vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property for the 
duration of World War II. Under the terms of this ordinance, the Governor of Nigeria, 
upon acquisition of the lands, was to declare them ‘native lands’ and to hold them in 
trust for the common benefit of all the inhabitants of the territory. This final 
acknowledgement by the British administration that the ex-German plantation lands 
were Bakweri property was subsequently endorsed in a special resolution on Bakweri 
lands adopted at the Sixth Meeting of the United Nations Trusteeship Council in 
March 1950. The second ordinance, the Cameroons Development Corporation 
Ordinance no. 39 (1946), provided for the foundation of the proposed corporation, the 
CDC. All the lands acquired by the governor under the first ordinance would be 
leased to this corporation, whose main objective was to develop and manage the lands 
in the interests of the people of the trust territory. 
 Following the passing of these two ordinances, the Governor of Nigeria 
immediately bought the plantation lands from the Custodian of Enemy Property for a 
sum of £850,000 and leased them to the newly established corporation for a period of 
sixty years, renewable for an equivalent term at the corporation’s discretion.22 The 
CDC, in turn, was supposed to pay monthly ground rents to the treasury but they were 
never transmitted to the Bakweri.  
 Although the first ordinance recognised Bakweri title to the CDC lands, the 
Bakweri Land Committee was not satisfied. It complained bitterly that it was not even 
treated with the courtesy of being informed of what the government intended to do 
with these lands. It had lodged several petitions in 1946 and continued to demand the 
return of these lands to the Bakweri people. 
 Unwilling to give up the struggle, the BLC decided to send a representative to 
the United Nations which had granted it a hearing after the receipt of its petition. 
E.M.L. Endeley was chosen to present its case. This move, however, was hindered by 
the British administration: while it had given the impression of financing Endeley’s 
trip to New York, it actually paid only his passage to Lagos, thus forcing Endeley to 
return to Cameroon.23 
 In reaction to the ongoing Bakweri protest, the British administration asked 
Mr W.M. Bridges, a senior district officer in the Southern Cameroons who was well 
acquainted with Bakweri society,24 to carry out an investigation into Bakweri land 
complaints and to recommend appropriate solutions. Bridges set off his investigation 
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in 1948 on the assumption that 15 acres (6 hectares) of land would be more than 
adequate for each Bakweri household. He eventually concluded that a surrender of 
25,000 acres of CDC land would satisfy Bakweri land requirements. He proposed that 
the land be used for the cultivation of food crops on a controlled tenancy basis and 
that the CDC should provide technical advice, social welfare services, and market 
facilities for approved crops.25 His report was presented by the British 
administrationto a visiting UN mission with a view to countering the points and 
arguments advanced by the BLC, which continued stressing that the Bakweri were not 
asking for an increase in land ownership but for a return of all their lands.  
 Until the departure of the British from the Trust Territory in 1961, neither the 
Bakweri land problem nor the settlement scheme proposed by the government had 
been resolved. The 31 December 1959 agreements that legalised the secession of the 
Southern Cameroons from the newly independent Republic of Nigeria, demanded that 
the CDC surrender to the government of Southern Cameroons all its rights, titles and 
interests under the previous leases and certificates of occupancy. The government of 
the Southern Cameroons, in turn, agreed to lease all those lands to the CDC for a 
period of ninety-nine years with effect from 1 January 1960. At the end of that period 
the CDC lands were to be transferred to the legitimate owners, the Bakweri. 
 After the reunification of the British and French Cameroons in 1961, the 
Bakweri land problem disappeared from the national agenda as the new political 
leaders increasingly turned their backs on ‘regional and parochial issues’ in their 
pursuit of national unity.26 Moreover, the post-colonial state became more interested 
in the expansion of the agro-industrial sector for the necessary modernisation and 
increase of agricultural production than in a return of plantation lands to their 
legitimate owners.27 In addition, post-colonial governments adopted, and even 
extended, the policy of the British Trusteeship Authority of co-opting some leading 
members of the Bakweri ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elites onto the Board of Directors 
and management of the CDC. 
 On 6 July 1974 the government promulgated law no. 74-1 that laid down the 
rules for governing land tenure in Cameroon.28 This law, which made a distinction 
between private and national lands, would later serve as the basis for rejecting prior 
Bakweri claims to the CDC lands on the grounds that these lands were national lands 
– a clear violation of the UN-sanctioned 1946 ordinances creating the CDC and the 
1959 agreements between the CDC and the government of the Southern Cameroons.29 
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This bold refutation of previous ordinances and agreements remained largely 
unchallenged because by this time the autocratic rule of President Ahmadou Ahidjo 
had silenced all organisations that were not under government control. The BLC died 
a natural death, although occasional memoranda were still presented to the 
government by its most dedicated members.  
 To the Bakweri however, the land issue continued to be a matter of priority, 
especially since the government made full use of the powers it had been granted by 
the 1974 land law to confiscate increasing amounts of native land in the name of ‘the 
imperative interest and defence of the economic policies of the nation’.30 Exactly 20 
years later, when it announced the privatisation of the CDC, the government would 
learn that the BLC, like the legendary phoenix, was merely lying in wait before rising 




Bakweri chiefs and the privatisation of the CDC 
Privatisation has been put forward by international donors as a magic formula capable 
of curing the ailing Cameroonian economy. At the start of the economic crisis in the 
mid 1980s,31 there were some 175 public enterprises in the country, employing around 
80,000 people.32 These enterprises served both economic and political ends. Besides 
being avenues to economic modernisation and growth, they allowed the government 
to engage in prebendal politics and to cement a ‘hegemonic alliance’, incorporating 
the country’s emerging elite into the state apparatus.33 A ‘patrimonial logic’ existed in 
many African post-colonial states,34 but was particularly strong in Cameroon, a 
country with stark ethnic and regional cleavages.35 It is beyond doubt that this logic 
contributed to the poor performance of most public and para-public enterprises.36 
Prior to the economic crisis, the Cameroonian government was subsidising parastatal-
sector losses to the tune of some 150 billion CFA francs a year. Though most of the 
oil revenues were initially kept in secret bank accounts abroad, their primary function 
soon became the covering of parastatal deficits. 
 From the very start of the economic crisis, the World Bank made parastatal 
reform the cornerstone of its lending conditions. Given the growing budgetary 
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constraints, the Biya government officially agreed to cooperate. In May 1987 it 
appointed a national commission to recommend reform measures for the parastatal 
sector. One year later the commission reported back to the president, having 
determined which institutions should be liquidated, sold to the private sector or 
revived. However, few public enterprises were effectively privatised, only six 
between 1988 and 1994.37 Van de Walle offered the following reasons for the slow 
pace of privatisation:38 
  
‘Although the government is proceeding with care on the politically sensitive issue of lay-
offs, this does not appear to be the major constraint on rapid implementation of the reform 
agenda. Rather, intra-elite competition and haggling over the rents freed up by 
privatisation, along with the lack of technical expertise within the state, served to slow 
down the process of institutional reform.’ 
  
Dissatisfied with the government’s performance, the World Bank threatened in early 
1994 to suspend a of US$ 75 million credit to Cameroon if the government did not 
accelerate the process of privatisation. Subsequently, on 15 July of that year, the 
government announced the privatisation of 15 large public enterprises. Among these 
were five agro-industrial parastatals, including the CDC. For various reasons 
(Konings 1996c: 211-212), the announced privatisation of the CDC incited 
commotion in the country, particularly in the Anglophone region.  
 The CDC is the most important agro-industrial parastatal in the country. It is 
one of the few agro-industrial enterprises in the world that specialises in a variety of 
crops – the four major ones being rubber, palm oil, tea and bananas. With the 
assistance of several international financial institutions, it expanded its cultivation 
area from 20,000 to 42,000 hectares after independence and reunification.39 It is the 
second largest employer in Cameroon, surpassed only by the government, and 
formerly employed 25,000 workers. At present, it still employs about 12,500 
permanent workers and a few thousand seasonal and casual workers. The CDC, in 
fact, has been of great significance to development in the Anglophone territory. 
Students of plantation agriculture, such as Beckford,40 have blamed the persistent 
poverty and underdevelopment of Third World economies on this mode of 
production. In the case of the CDC, however, this thesis finds little support. The 
corporation has been a major instrument of modernisation and is largely credited with 
whatever socio-economic development has occurred in Anglophone Cameroon. It has 
created employment for many men and women, has constructed numerous roads, 
supplied water and electricity, built and staffed schools, awarded a substantial number 
of scholarships, provided medical care for a large proportion of the local population, 
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and has stimulated the supply of goods and services to itself and its workers. It has 
played a key role in the commercialisation and modernisation of peasant production, 
as an intermediary in marketing the Bakweri peasantry banana production in the 
1950s and in the establishment of regional smallholders’ oil palm and rubber schemes 
since the early 1960s.41 Of late, it has handed over a substantial part of its oil palm 
plantations to local contractors. As a result, the CDC has been called the economic 
lifeline of Anglophone Cameroon. 
 Government announcement of the privatisation of this important agro-
industrial enterprise was all the more shocking to the Anglophone population since 
the CDC:  
  
• had been one of the rare public enterprises in Cameroon to perform relatively 
well until the economic crisis;  
• had been able to survive this crisis mainly because the management and 
workers had agreed to adopt a series of drastic adjustment measures aimed at 
cost reduction and productivity increase; and  
• was on the way to economic recovery following the 50 per cent devaluation of 
the CFA franc in early 1994.42  
  
That the government singled out the CDC for privatisation irrespective of its bright 
prospects for recovery and its immense contribution to regional development was 
regarded by the Anglophone community as provocation and can only be fully grasped 
with reference to what has come to be called the ‘Anglophone problem’.43 The 
essence of this problem is that the Anglophone minority feels ‘marginalised, exploited 
and assimilated’ by the Francophone-dominated state and even by the Francophone 
population as a whole in the aftermath of reunification in 1961. It was not until the 
political liberalisation process of the early 1990s that the Anglophones started openly 
organising in various associations and pressure groups to protest against their alleged 
subordinate position and to put forward claims for self-determination and autonomy. 
These newly created Anglophone movements were inclined to perceive the 
privatisation of the CDC as a further step in the dismantling of the Anglophone 
colonial legacy by the Francophone-dominated state. They were therefore determined 
to form a united front to maintain control over the CDC, the pride and economic 
lifeline of Anglophone Cameroon, and forestall its sale to Francophone or French 
interests. Several protest marches were organised in the region, demanding the 
government revoke its decision forthwith.44 
 Unsurprisingly, the most vehement opposition in Anglophone Cameroon came 
from the landowners. As soon as the privatisation of the CDC was announced, the 
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Bakweri chiefs and elite mobilised to revive the moribund BLC and to adopt a 
common position with regard to the privatisation, which had been planned without the 
slightest consideration of the Bakweri land problem. Soon thereafter the BLC was 
renamed the Bakweri Land Claim Committee (BLCC). 
 On 23 July 1994, the Bakweri chiefs and elite met in Buea under the 
chairmanship of Paramount Chief S.M.L. Endeley of Buea and Paramount Chief F. 
Bille Manga Williams of Victoria (Limbe) to discuss the implications of the 
government decision. They agreed to strongly oppose the announced privatisation on 
the grounds that the CDC lands were Bakweri property and could thus not be sold to 
non-natives without Bakweri consent. After lengthy and passionate discussions, an 
ad-hoc committee was elected by acclamation to assist the BLCC in preparing a 
detailed memorandum on the Bakweri position to be presented to the government and 
all other interested parties.45 
 On 4 August 1994, over 500 Bakweri chiefs, notables and elite gathered at the 
Buea Youth Cultural and Animation Center and approved the memorandum drawn up 
by the ad hoc committee. In the memorandum, the Bakweri agreed that, if 
privatisation had to take place at all, it should be on the basis of ‘a creative and 
enlightened partnership between the owners of the land on which the corporation 
operates and the providers of finance capital without which it would not be possible to 
run a modern, technologically sophisticated agro-industrial complex like the CDC’.46 
They insisted that any privatisation plan should be based on ‘terms which recognise 
the ownership of land as a distinct variable which, together with the cash, make 
plantation agriculture possible; consequently, landowners deserve ground rent 
compensation in much the same way as the CDC was liable to pay ground rents for 
the use of the land’.47 The memorandum was later presented to the Provincial 
Governor for onward transmission to President Biya. At the end of this historic 
meeting, the eminent Bakweri scholar, Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale, secretary of the 
ad hoc committee, was designated counsel for the Bakweri people with instructions to 
present their case before the United Nations and other international forums.  
 The Bakweri case was strongly supported by Anglophone movements. A 
powerfully worded petition to the head of state, co-signed by the Anglophone 
movements and the Bakweri chiefs, reiterated that the Bakweri had never relinquished 
ownership of the CDC lands and that the corporation could not be sold without 
Bakweri consent. It pointed out that the Bakweri had never been paid royalties for the 
use of their lands since the creation of the CDC in 1946. It also stressed that the 
Bakweri were not inclined to renew the 60-year CDC lease, reclaiming the CDC lands 
after its expiry in 2007.48 
                                                 
45 See Fako International, vol. 1, no. 2 (January 1995), pp. 14-16.  
46 Memorandum of the Bakweri People on the Presidential Decree to Privatise or Sell the Cameroon 
Development Corporation, Buea, 27 July 1994. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Konings 1996c: 213. 
 Concerned with the mounting anger in the Anglophone region in general and 
the Bakweri community in particular, the Biya government decided to send a 
delegation of high-ranking Anglophone allies to the South West Province to appease 
the population. The delegation was led by Chief Ephraim Inoni, Deputy Secretary 
General at the Presidency and Chief of Bakingili, a village located on the territory of a 
Bakweri subgroup. The delegation met a number of Bakweri representatives in Buea 
to discuss the land problem. Though speaking on behalf of the government, Chief 
Inoni appealed to the Bakweri representatives not to forget that he was one of them. 
He acknowledged that there should have been prior contact between the government 
and the Bakweri before the announcement of the corporation’s privatisation but he 
denied the widespread rumours in Anglophone Cameroon that the French and some 
high-ranking Francophones had masterminded the whole operation. While admitting 
that the financial situation of the corporation had improved after the 1994 devaluation 
of the CFA franc, he argued that privatisation would enable the corporation to obtain 
new capital for necessary investments in production and processing. The Bakweri 
Paramount Chief, S.M.L. Endeley,49 who had always been a staunch supporter of the 
regime until the Bakweri land issue arose, then took the floor. Amid thunderous 
applause he declared that he himself, as the custodian of the ancestral lands, and the 
Bakweri population as a whole were against the privatisation of the CDC. He 
requested Chief Inoni to report this to President Biya: 
  
‘We are in a country where we like to cheat ourselves, where government hands decisions 
through dictatorship (...) We say no, no (to privatisation), go and tell Mr Biya that he 
cannot afford to go down in history as the man who sold the CDC.’50 
  
After the government delegation returned to Yaoundé, the government did not 
undertake any further action with regard to the CDC privatisation. This apparent 
victory for Anglophone resistance turned out to be short-lived however. In 1997 
rumours of an imminent privatisation of the CDC became more and more persistent. 
In compliance with the accord that had been agreed with the IMF and the World Bank 
within the framework of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 
1997, the privatisation of the CDC was expected to be launched soon. That the 
government, under severe pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions, was 
preparing the ground for the privatisation of the CDC could be concluded from the 
speeches and interviews of leading government and CDC officials at the opening 
ceremony of the corporation’s golden-jubilee celebration in Bota-Victoria on 1 
December 1997. In his speech on that occasion, the newly appointed Prime Minister 
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Peter Mafany Musonge, a Bakwerian himself who had been the CDC’s general 
manager from 1988 to 1997, said: 
  
‘Since the traditional international funding agencies no longer finance corporations like 
CDC, the establishment should be prepared (…) to foster new business relationships to 
raise new money while the state plays the role of facilitator (…). Traditional rulers within 
CDC’s areas of operation, workers and other Cameroonians must understand perfectly 
well and make sure that peace reigns for conclusive investment.’51 
  
 The CDC’s chairman, Mr N.N. Mbile, added that ‘privatisation should not 
scare us as we are confident that government will protect the interests of the 
Cameroonian people, the original landowners, the workers, new investors and the 
state itself’. Moreover, the CDC deputy general manager, Mr Richard Grey, then 
revealed that the highly reputable international consultancy firm Coopers and Lybrand 
had already been selected by the World Bank and the government to carry out a study 
into the privatisation of the CDC that would be completed by 30 June 1998. The 
Bakweri chiefs who attended the ceremony, notably Chief S.M.L. Endeley of Buea, 
were frustrated by these statements and revelations and condemned any future 
privatisation.52 
 The CDC was finally put up for sale in January 1999. Few protests were heard 
from the now almost dormant Anglophone movements.53 Their leadership’s only 
activity was to make a strongly worded statement on 10 April 1999 warning 
prospective CDC buyers to desist from investing in the purchase of the CDC. Bakweri 
chiefs and elite, however, quickly rallied again. In a meeting with southwestern 
members of parliament and government, they denounced the privatisation of the CDC 
saying that the latter’s acceptance of the sale of the CDC ‘was tantamount to a 
betrayal of their people’.54 The BLCC officially wrote to President Biya on behalf of 
the Bakweri people on 3 March 1999 requesting that it be included in the privatisation 
negotiations and that compensation be paid for the use of Bakweri lands. When 
rumours spread that various multinational companies like Fruitiers/Dole, Chiquita and 
Del Monte were already negotiating with individual government officials about the 
purchase of the whole or parts of the CDC at throwaway prices, the Bakweri in the 
diaspora once again addressed the head of state on 1 October 1999 in support of the 
BLCC position.55  
 Since no reply was forthcoming from the presidency, the BCLL, strongly 
supported by regional organisations of chiefs and elite like the South West Chiefs’ 
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Conference (SWECC) and the South West Elite Association (SWELA),56 decided to 
raise national and international awareness by starting a high-profile public relations 
campaign through the writing of open letters, petitions and newspaper articles and the 
use of the Internet. For this purpose, the BLCC was reconstituted and an interim 
bureau of the BLCC was established in the United States. 
 During a BLCC general assembly meeting on 15 April 2000 it was decided 
that only chiefs could occupy the positions of president and vice-president (the four 
vice-presidents representing each of the subdivisions in the Fako Division of the 
South West Province). Other traditional rulers would constitute the Chiefs’ Advisory 
Council of the Board of Trustees. The ‘modern’ elite would occupy positions in the 
secretariat and act as technical advisors. This division of labour was meant to 
demonstrate that the chiefs were the leaders of the Bakweri communities and best 
capable of mobilising and sensitising their subjects, while the ‘modern’ elite had the 
bureaucratic and technical capabilities to operate the secretariat and provide the 
organisation with any necessary advice. 
 In May 2000, the BLCC interim bureau was set up in the United States to 
establish an effective, active and visible BLCC presence within the Bakweri and 
Cameroonian diaspora community and to open permanent lines of communication 
with all potential buyers of the CDC, donor agencies, NGOs and foreign governments 
directly or indirectly involved in the sale of the CDC. The BLCC-USA became very 
vocal, creating its own website on the Internet57. Its first action was to send a 
memorandum to the managing director of the IMF, Mr Horst Köhler, on 16 June 
2000. In this memorandum, it warned him about the growing unrest among the 
Bakweri and threatened legal action should the privatisation of the CDC be pursued 
without BLCC involvement: 
  
‘As the current impasse in Zimbabwe and Kenya demonstrates, land expropriated from 
African natives by European colonialists a century ago is the source of much 
contemporary unrest and instability. All Cameroonians of goodwill bear witness that the 
Bakweri people have over the years opted for a peaceful resolution of the CDC Bakweri 
land problem. However, should the privatisation of the CDC go ahead without the imput 
of the Bakweri on whose land most of the corporation’s agro-industrial activities are 
located, we preserve the right to seek legal redress against the government of the 
Republic of Cameroon, the IMF, the World Bank as well as all lessees who derive title to 
the land by whatever means, in any country of the world where such bodies are located’.58 
  
This was followed by massive pro-BLCC demonstrations in New York and 
Washington during the September 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit that was 
attended by a huge Cameroonian delegation led by President Paul Biya. As a result of 
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these demonstrations and a flurry of other pro-BLCC activities on this occasion, the 
embarrassed Cameroonian delegation, along with leading donor agencies, were able 
to gauge the high levels of support for the BLCC within the entire Cameroonian 
diaspora community in the United States.  
 In a press release on 5 August 2000, the BLCC revealed that it was going to 
take its campaign for land restitution and compensation ‘a notch higher’ by seeking 
consultative status within the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). 59 It believed that the granting of consultative status would provide it with 
a global platform to proclaim its struggle for land rights, ‘bringing it into contact with 
other NGOs which claim to represent the interests of indigenous groups from around 
the world as well as with sympathetic UN members who have championed the cause 
of dispossessed people on the floor of the General Assembly and at the numerous 
ECOSOC meetings over the years’.60 Soon thereafter, on 21 August 2000, the 
Counsel of the BLCC, Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale, was invited by the United 
Nations to make a representation on the Bakweri lands issue to the UN Human Rights 
Commission in Geneva. 
 Following the government’s renewed call for tenders for the sale of the CDC 
in September 2000, the BLCC cautioned prospective buyers in an open letter by 
saying that: 
  
‘(…) it is our duty to advise you to think twice before you commit the resources of your 
shareholders in a venture that is still mired in controversy and whose promised financial 
and economic rewards may prove to be illusory in the long run.’61 
  
During the late 1990s it had become increasingly evident that the BLCC was finding 
it hard to defend Bakweri interests at the national level. This had been particularly the 
case when in 1996, ‘their own son’, Peter Mafany Musonge, had been appointed as 
prime minister. Without doubt, one of the main reasons for his appointment to this 
position was that President Biya regarded him, being an ex-CDC general manager and 
a Bakweri, as the most suitable candidate to handle the delicate issue of CDC 
privatisation. 
 The appointment of Musonge had initially raised high expectations among the 
Bakweri. They were convinced that their son would pay particular attention to the 
land question and take Bakweri interests into consideration during the eventual sale of 
the CDC. Their expectations appeared to have had solid foundations because, in his 
former capacity as CDC general manager, Musonge had publicly declared during a 
radio interview in 1994 that any privatisation of the CDC should be ‘not only 
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economically effective but also socially equitable’.62 He expressed his belief that 
indigenous landowners, workers and investors would be directly involved in this 
endeavour. Once appointed prime minister however, he came under immense pressure 
from the IMF and his master, Paul Biya, to champion the economic advantages of 
CDC privatisation and to forget about the payment of any compensation to Bakweri 
landowners. Unable to convince his ethnic group to give up its claim to what could 
possibly amount to tens of billions of CFA francs after more than fifty years of CDC 
existence,  Musonge was eventually reported to have resorted to intimidation by 
means of the Buea Subprefect and the Fako Prefect. 
 In March 2000, the Buea Subprefect, Mr Aboubakar Njikam, thus banned a 
BLCC general assembly meeting for which he had given his approval at an earlier 
stage. When he learnt that compensation was high on the agenda, the prime minister 
appears to have quickly ordered a halt to the meeting, but he failed to intimidate the 
committee that eventually met on 15 April 2000. In June 2000, the Fako Prefect, Jean-
Robert Mengue Meka, accused it of being an illegal organisation and the committee 
was ordered to stop its activities. Two of the newly elected BLCC executives, Chief 
Peter Moky Efange (President) and Mola Njoh Litumbe (Secretary-General), 
responded by telling Mengue Meka that he was acting illegally himself by claiming 
that the BLCC, which was founded as early as 1946, was an unlawful association. The 
prefect was reminded that the BLCC was a duly incorporated organisation that had 
been registered in accordance with the laws of the country and had been received by 
the South West Governor in 1994 and could thus not now have its legality 
questioned.63 
 As a result of the high profile BLCC publicity both at home and abroad, the 
prime minister could no longer ignore the committee and its demands. He invited it to 
a working session in his Yaoundé office and on 4 October 2000, the BLCC leadership 
met with Musonge, Chief Ephraim Inoni, the Bakweri Deputy General Secretary at 
the Presidency and a number of other government officials. During this meeting 
Musonge conceded that the issues of land ownership and the payment of ground rents 
were legitimate demands but urged that these demands be pursued separately from the 
issue of privatisation. He argued that a hostile environment was being created by the 
BLCC protest campaign which was scaring off potential investors.64 
 The BLCC delegation agreed with the prime minister that privatisation would 
be successful only in a peaceful atmosphere but it pointed out that the Bakweri protest 
actions, such as the UN Millennium Summit demonstrations, stemmed from the lack 
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of government response to their pleas and representations. It stressed that Bakweri 
protest actions would inevitably continue until ‘justice, equity, and legitimate rights of 
the Bakweri were met’. The delegation then reiterated the main BLCC demands: 
  
• that the government recognise that the lands occupied by the CDC were 
private property as defined by Part II of the 1974 Land Law and that the 
Bakweri were the legitimate owners of these lands; 
• that the Bakweri be fully involved in the CDC privatisation negotiations to 
ensure that their interests were effectively protected; 
• that ground rents be paid to a Bakweri land trust fund; and 
• that the Bakweri, acting jointly or individually be allocated a specific 
percentage of shares in each of the privatised sectors of the corporation.65 
  
While the BLCC was trying to embark on a dialogue with local and national 
authorities, it continued to caution potential CDC buyers and the Bretton Woods 
institutions against any privatisation of the corporation without the involvement of the 
landowners. The latter, in turn, pressurised the Cameroonian government to settle the 
privatisation imbroglio. In the wake of the reluctance of foreign companies to invest 
in the CDC primarily caused by the unresolved land issue, the government was 
compelled to reissue the CDC bid for tenders first on 1 January 2001 and then again 
on 1 January 2002.  
 At the moment the Cameroonian government appears to have accepted a 
privatisation construction that closely resembles the original proposal launched by 
Musonge when he was still CDC general manager, involving the landowners, the 
workers and the investors. It intends to sell a majority stake in each CDC sector 
(rubber, oil palm, tea and bananas) to foreign companies. However, CDC lands will 
not be sold but offered on a long-lease basis to soothe the Bakweri landowners who 
fear loss of their lands in the process. Other shares will be sold to the workers and 





In this chapter I have highlighted the powerful resistance of Bakweri chiefs to the 
Cameroonian government announcement of the privatisation of the CDC. It would be 
wrong to conclude that Bakweri chiefs are against privatisation per se. In fact, in their 
1994 petition to the head of state they clearly stated that: 
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‘In principle, the Bakweri and other Anglophones have no quarrel with the idea of 
privatisation or sale of companies in which government enjoys majority control since we 
fully understand the logic behind such an exercise, i.e. the relocation of the management 
of inefficiently managed parastatals in more efficient hands. We recognise that 
government, as the controlling shareholder in these companies, has an obligation to the 
majority shareholders and the Cameroonian taxpayer to ensure that their tax revenues are 
not wasted in failing parastatals’. 
  
I have argued that the strong opposition of Bakweri chiefs to the privatisation of the 
CDC derived from the following factors: 
  
• They regarded the CDC privatisation as a provocation to the Anglophone 
community. They pointed out that the CDC had the reputation of being one of 
the rare parastatals in Cameroon that has both played a significant role in 
regional development and performed relatively well until the economic 
crisis.  
• They claimed ownership of the CDC lands. Since the 1940s they have been 
engaged in a fierce and protracted struggle for the retrieval of the Bakweri 
lands that were expropriated by the Germans for plantation agriculture. They 
therefore bitterly complained that they, as the custodians of the Bakweri lands, 
were never consulted prior to the announcement of the corporation’s 
privatisation and they demanded compensation for any sale or lease of CDC 
lands to multinational companies. 
 
The oppositional role of Bakweri chiefs to the establishment and privatisation of 
the CDC has important implications for current debates on their position in the 
local society and in the national arena. Geschiere has pointed out two reasons for 
the integration of chieftaincy, 67 which was more or less a colonial creation, into 
Bakweri society: chieftaincy was strengthened during British indirect rule and, even 
more significantly, it became a potential rallying point against the ‘strangers’ who 
invaded the Bakweri territory in large numbers, attracted by the plantation economy 
created by the Germans. My study suggests that the persistent struggle of the Bakweri 
chiefs since the 1940s for justice with regard to the expropriated Bakweri lands may 
have been an even more important factor for rooting chieftaincy in local society. 
While chiefs in Anglophone Cameroon have been officially transformed into 
‘auxiliaries’ of the state in the aftermath of independence and reunification and most 
chiefs maintain close links with the ruling party,68 my case study proves that Bakweri 
chiefs cannot be characterised as mere puppets of the regime.69 As in other parts of 
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Africa,70 large-scale state expropriation of the local community’s land has been a 
permanent source of conflict between the state and Bakweri chiefs.  
 In their long-standing struggle to retrieve ancestral lands and in vehement 
opposition to the current privatisation of the CDC, the Bakweri chiefs have been 
continuously assisted by the whole Bakweri elite at home and in the diaspora, 
irrespective of their political affiliation. This elite has placed its bureaucratic and 
technical competence at the disposal of the BLCC, the legitimate representative of the 
Bakweri people in seeking the restoration of their ancestral land rights. It makes use 
of modern communication lines, including the Internet, to caution potential investors 
and the Bretton Woods institutions against any privatisation without Bakweri consent 
and compensation. While this has had the effect of scaring off foreign capital, the 
government has been unable to control this form of ‘modern’ resistance. 
 The Bakweri chiefs have also been supported by the newly created 
Anglophone associations that are inclined to perceive the Bakweri land issue as part 
of their struggle to redress the marginalisation and subordination of their region 
within the Francophone-dominated state. 
 The combined force of Bakweri and Anglophone ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
elites has compelled the government to repeatedly postpone the actual privatisation of 
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